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Endogenous Labour Market Imperfection and the HOS Model: Some 
Counterintuitive Trade-theoretic Results 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (hereafter, HOS) model with Stolper-Samuelson (SS) theorem 
at its core is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of international trade. In the HOS model 
both commodity and factor markets are perfectly competitive that limits the application of such a 
model for the purpose of analyzing the problems of a developing economy where the existence 
of factor market imperfection is a salient feature. Attempts have been made to use derivatives of 
the HOS model with labour market imperfection to address the problems of such economies. 
One example of this is the Corden and Findlay (1975) (CF hereafter) model). They have 
extended the Harris-Todaro (1970) (HT) model by allowing perfect capital mobility between the 
rural and the urban sectors, thereby integrating the HT structure with the orthodox HOS trade 
model. The CF is a dual economy model with exogenous labour market distortion in the urban 
sector and does not satisfy the Stolper-Samuelson theorem completely. For example, if the price 
of the labour-intensive commodity changes the return to capital in nominal terms does not 
change.  
 
Otherwise, as shown by Marjit and Beladi (2003), this structure more or less behaves like the 
standard HOS model and certain important trade theoretic results remain undisturbed. For 
example, the welfare effect of foreign capital with full repatriation of foreign capital earnings is 
immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive1 and is protected by an import 
tariff. This is the standard ‘Brecher-Alejandro’ (1977) (BA) proposition which is valid in the CF 
set-up despite the presence of labour market distortion (Khan 1982). This is due to the ‘envelope 
                                                 
1
 The BA (1977) proposition has been proved in terms of the HOS framework. Here a necessary 
condition for the proposition to hold good requires that the tariff-protected import-competing sector must 
be capital-intensive in physical sense. However, when we consider an HT structure, as has done by Khan 
(1982), the import-competing sector has to be capital-intensive in value sense which automatically 
implies that the sector is capital-intensive in physical sense. 
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property’ of the CF model where the average wage of the workers is equal to the rural sector 
wage. So long as the ‘envelope property’ holds the BA proposition will carry over in the HT 
framework under the modified assumption on factor intensity. There are a number of works that 
have examined trade policy and growth with domestic distortions. This includes works of Kemp 
and Negishi (1970), Ohyama (1972), Panagariya and Eaton (1979, 1982), Chaudhuri (2005) etc.  
 
On the other hand, there exists a theoretical literature on endogenous wage determination in the 
unionized labour market in the formal sector of a two sector general equilibrium model and it 
consists of works of Calvo (1978), Quibria (1988), Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2009), etc. 
Wage determination in each of these models is based on the monopoly trade union framework as 
well as on the Nash bargaining framework. They have derived a unionized wage function where 
the unionized and non-unionized wages are positively correlated.  However, little has been said 
about conditions under which inflows of foreign capital or a policy of trade liberalization would 
be necessarily harmful or beneficial. Batra (1973) has shown that in the presence of a tariff 
distortion in the product market how the presence of an imperfection in the labour market affects 
welfare in a small open economy. However, he has considered only exogenous distortion in the 
labour market and does not examine the validity of the properties of the HOS model and 
compare his results with the CF case. 
 
The present paper introduces endogenous labour market distortion in an otherwise HOS 
structure. The analysis has found that the Stolper-Samuelson theorem and the magnification 
effect are valid despite introduction of endogenous labour market imperfections where the 
unionized wage is a positive function of the non-unionized wage rate, the bargaining power of 
the trade union and the commodity price. Besides, we have derived precise conditions for inflow 
of foreign capital to be welfare-improving in the presence or absence of any tariff distortion and 
also for tariff reforms to be welfare-deteriorating. These results cannot be obtained in the CF 
framework with exogenous distortion in the labour market.  
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2. The Model 
 
We consider the standard HOS model with labour market imperfection in sector 2. In sector 2 
(formal sector) workers receive the unionized wage, *W , while their counterparts in sector 1 (an 
informal sector) receive a low and competitive wage,W . All other standard assumptions of the 
HOS model are retained. Commodity prices are given by the small open economy assumption.  
 
The unionized wage is determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining game between the 
representative firm and the representative labour union in the unionized formal sector and is 
written as follows.2 
( )
* (1 )PQ LW U U W
L
= + −          (1)  
 
The unionized wage function in general form is written as follows. 
* *( , , )W W P W U=           (1.1) 
 
Differentiating (1) it can be easily shown that3 
* 1( ) ( )( (.) ) 0W PQ WL
U L
∂
= − >
∂
 
2
* ( (.))( ) (1 ) 0
LL
W U WL PQU
W L PQ
∂ −
= − + >
∂
;                        (2) 
2
(.)( )*( ) [ ] 0LL L L
LL
UPQ Q L Q UWLQW
P PQ L
+ −∂
= >
∂
if ( ) 0LL LQ L Q+ ≤ i.e 1Lξ ≥ , 
where ( )LLL
L
LQ
Qξ = − is the elasticity of marginal product curve of labour.
4
             
     
                                                 
2
 This function has been derived in Appendix I. 
3
 See Appendix I. 
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This establishes the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The unionized wage is a positive function of both the informal wage rate and the 
bargaining strength of the labour union. It is also a positive function of the commodity price 
if 1Lξ ≥ . 
 
From (1) it can also be checked that5 
2{(1 ) ( (.)}*( ) [ ] 0;
* ( *) *(1 )
LL L
W
U L Q U LQ Q WW WE
WW UPf L WL U
− + −∂
= = >
∂ + −
 
{ (.) ( (.))}*( ) ( )[ ] 0
* ( ( ) (1 ))
LL L L
P
LL
Q LQ Q LQ QW P PUE
PW LQ UPQ L WL U
− −∂
= = >
∂ + −
if 1Lξ ≥ and,             (3) 
( ) 1W PE E+ =  
 
2.1 The S-S theorem and magnification effect 
 
The general equilibrium set-up is given by the following set of equations. 
1 1 1L KWa ra P+ =           (4) 
2 2 2 2*( , , ) L KW P W U a ra P+ =          (5) 
1 1 2 2K Ka X a X K+ =           (6) 
1 1 2 2L La X a X L+ =           (7) 
where jia s is the requirement of the j th factor required to produce one unit of output of 
sector i for ,j L K= ; and, 1,2i = . 
 
Equations (4) and (5) are the two zero-profit conditions for the two sectors while equations (6) 
and (7) are the full-employment conditions for capital and labour, respectively. We assume that 
                                                                                                                                                            
4
 This is only a sufficient condition. There can be another sufficient condition under which *( ) 0W
P
∂
>
∂
. 
See appendix I. 
5
 See Appendix I. 
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sector 1 is more (less) labour-intensive (capital-intensive) than sector 2 in value sense i.e. 
1 2
1 2
*L L
K K
Wa W a
a a
> . As *W W>  it automatically implies that sector 1 is more (less) labour-intensive 
(capital-intensive) than sector 2 in physical sense.  
 
Differentiating equations (4) and (5) totally, applying the envelope conditions and arranging 
terms in a matrix notation we obtain 
1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
ˆˆ
          
ˆ
     ˆ (1 )
L K
L W K P L
PW
E r P E
θ θ
θ θ θ
   
=    
−      
       (8) 
where the determinant to the coefficient-matrix is 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) (1 )L K K L W L L W L L WE E Eθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ= − = − − −  
                                                                            2 1 1 2( ) (1 ) 0K K W K K WE Eθ θ θ θ= − − − >      (9) 
jiθ is the distributive share of the j th factor in the i th sector; and, “^” means proportional 
change. 
We now state and prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 2: If 1 2ˆ ˆP P> the following ranking must hold: 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆW P P r> > > .   
 
Proof: 
Solving (8) by Cramer’s rule 
2 1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ(1 )
ˆ K K P LP E PW θ θ θ
θ
− −
=             (10) 
Now if 1 2ˆ ˆP P> from (10) it follows that 
2 1 1 2
1
ˆ ( )( )
ˆ
K K K L PEW B
P
θ θ θ θ
θ
− +
> = (say) 
Now
1
ˆ
( ) 1
ˆ
W B
P
> ≥  iff 2 1 1 2( )K K K L PEθ θ θ θ θ− + ≥ . Using (9) and simplifying one gets 
1
ˆ
( ) 1
ˆ
W B
P
> ≥  iff 2( ) 1P WE E+ ≥ . Using (3) it follows that 
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1
ˆ ˆW P>            (11) 
Similarly, solving (9) it is easy to show that 
2
ˆrˆ P<             (12) 
 
Combining (11) and (12) one can write 
1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆW P P r> > > . 
If 1 2ˆ ˆ 0P P> = , 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ0W P P r> > = > . 
This completes the proof. 
 
It is important to note that the Rybczynski effect and the Rybczynski-type effect that occurs 
following an S-S effect if production technologies are of variable coefficient type also hold in 
this case. 
 
2.2 Some counterintuitive trade-theoretic results 
 
Now suppose that there a tariff on sector 2. Equation (5) is, therefore, modified to 
*
2 2 2 2*( , , ) L KW P W U a ra P+ =          (5.1) 
where *2 2 (1 )P P t= + is the tariff-inclusive domestic price of commodity 2. 
 
We also assume that the aggregate capital stock of the economy consists of both domestic capital 
( DK ) and foreign capital ( FK ) and these are perfect substitutes. The capital endowment equation 
is now given by 
1 1 2 2K K D Fa X a X K K K+ = + =         (6.1) 
 
The strictly quasi-concave social welfare function is given by 
1 2( , )V V D D=   (13) 
where iD  denotes the demand for the i th commodity for 1,2i = . 
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Given that international trade occurs, trade balance requires that 
1 1 2 2 2( ) ( ) FX D P D X rK− = − +  
or, * *1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2( ) FD P D X P X tP D X rK+ = + + − −   (14) 
where 1 1( )X D−  is the amount of 1X  exported and 2 2( )D X− denotes the amount of 2X  that is 
imported. 
 
Differentiation of (13) yields 
*
1 1 2 2( / )dV V dD P dD= +   (15) 
 
National income at domestic prices is given by 
*
1 2 2 2 FY X P X tP M rK= + + −   (16) 
where, M denotes the volume of import and is given by 
*
2 2 2( , )M D P Y X= −   (17) 
 
2.3 Welfare consequences of foreign capital inflow and trade liberalization  
 
Differentiating (13), (14), (16), (17), (6.1), (7) and the production functions and substituting into 
(15) the following expressions can be obtained.6 
1 2
2 2
1
1( ) ( )[( * ) ]
                       (+)
L
L
v XdV W W a tP
V dK K
λ
λ= − −
          (18) 
2
2
1 1
1
1( ) ( )[( * )( ){ (1 )}
                                           (+)                (+)
LK
W K L P
TL SdV v W W E E
V dt t
θ θ
θ
= − + −
 
                                        
22 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
( * ){ } ( ) ( ) ]
               (+)                            (+)                     (-)    
L
L K
W W a tP X A A tP Hλ λλ
− −
+ + +
    (19) 
                                                 
6
 See Appendix III for detailed derivations.  
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where: *2 2[(1 ) /{1 (1 )}] 0; ( / )v t t m m P D Y= + + − > = ∂ ∂ is the marginal propensity to consume 
commodity 2 (1 0m> > ); and, *2 2 2 2[( / ) ( / )] 0H D P D D Y= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ < is the Slutsky’s pure 
substitution term. 
 
From (18) and (19) the following proposition can be established. 
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital improves social welfare iff 2 2( * ) LW W a tP− > . On 
the other hand, a policy of trade liberalization is welfare-worsening if 
22 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
( * )[{ } ( ) ( ) ] 0L L K
W W a tP X A A tP Hλ λλ
− −
+ + ≥ .7 
 
We explain proposition 3 as follows. An inflow of foreign capital leads to a Rybczynski effect. 
Sector 2 expands and sector 1 contracts, as the former sector is capital-intensive. As the higher 
wage-paying sector expands, both in terms of output and employment, the aggregate wage 
income of the workers increase. This we call the labour reallocation effect that works positively 
on social welfare and is captured by the first term in the right-hand side of (18). On the other 
hand, an expansion of sector 2 leads to further misallocation of economic resources, lowers 
volumes of trade thereby exerting a downward pressure on welfare. This is the cost of the tariff 
protection of the supply side8 which is captured by the second term in the right-hand side of (18). 
We call it the output effect of the formal sector industry that affects welfare adversely. Welfare 
improves if the positive labour reallocation effect dominates over the increased cost of tariff 
protection.  
 
A policy of trade liberalization, on the other hand, lessens, t . This lowers r and raisesW and 
hence *W . However, the higher wage-paying sector contracts both in terms of output and 
employment due to a Rybczynski type effect. Thus, there are two components of the labour 
                                                 
7
 There can be other sufficient conditions under which a policy of trade liberalization might be welfare-
deteriorating.  
8
 As the output of the tariff-protected sector rises the deadweight loss to the society due to further 
misallocation of economic resources goes up thereby lowering social welfare.  
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reallocation effect. As the two wage rates increase the aggregate wage income increases. On the 
contrary, as the higher (lower) wage-paying sector contracts (expands) the aggregate wage 
income goes down. The net effect is, however, ambiguous. Finally, the consumers would be 
consuming more of commodity 2 leading to a decrease in cost of tariff protection of the demand 
side that works positively on welfare. Besides, as the protected sector contracts the efficiency of 
allocation of economic resources also improves. The cost of protection of the supply side 
decreases which also works favourably on welfare. If the net labour reallocation effect is 
negative and is stronger than the combined effect of the last two effects, welfare decreases due to 
trade liberalization. See equation (19).  
 
In the absence of any labour market imperfection, we have *W W= . Then the model boils down 
to the standard HOS model. There is no labour reallocation effect. The first terms in the right-
hand side of equations (18) and (19) vanish and we get the following standard results: an inflow 
of foreign capital definitely worsens welfare. On the contrary, a policy of trade liberalization 
unambiguously improves social welfare.  
 
It is worthwhile to mention that in the CF model we get different results due to the ‘envelope 
property’. In the CF model there is no labour reallocation effect as the rural sector wage does not 
change following an inflow of foreign capital. Welfare unambiguously worsens due to negative 
tariff revenue effect. On the other hand, a reduction in import tariff lowers the return to capital 
and raises the rural sector wage. The aggregate wage income increases which works favourably 
on welfare. Besides, the tariff-protected import-competing sector contracts which also improves 
social welfare due to reduction in the cost of tariff protection. Welfare, therefore, unambiguously 
improves. 
 
3. Concluding remarks 
 
In this note, we have shown that the HOS model with endogenous labour market imperfection 
not only satisfies all the standard properties like S-S theorem, magnification and Rybczynski 
effects but also is capable of producing certain counterintuitive trade-theoretic results. A two-
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sector mobile capital version of the HT model does not satisfy these properties. Hence, the 
present framework may be useful in explaining as to why the developing countries are yearning 
for foreign capital despite the standard immiserizing result and why these countries are not 
reducing the tariff rates beyond certain levels. 
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Appendix I: Determination of unionized wage 
 
We consider a competitive formal sector industry. Labour (L) is the only variable input of 
production. The labour market facing the industry is unionized. Each firm in the industry has a 
separate trade union. The unionized wage is determined as a solution to the Nash bargaining 
game between the representative firm and the representative labour union. 
 
The representative firm’s profit function is given by: 
( ) *PQ L W LΠ = −           (A.1) 
where P is the exogenously given price of the formal sector’s product. 
 
The representative labour union maximizes the aggregate wage income of its members net of 
their opportunity wage income i.e. 
( * )W W LΩ = −           (A.2) 
 
The informal sector wage,W , is the opportunity wage to the workers in the industry. This is 
because any worker failing to get employment in the formal will surely be getting a job in the 
informal sector. 
 
We consider a cooperative game between the firm and the labour union that leads to 
determination of the unionized wage, *W  and the employment level, L . If the two parties fail to 
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reach an agreement no production will take place and the workers have to accept jobs in the 
informal sector. So given the objective functions of the two parties, represented by equations 
(A.1) and (A.2), the disagreement pay-off is: [0 , 0] . 
 
The Nash bargaining solution is obtained from the following optimization exercise. 
Max (1 )[ ( ) * ] [( * ) ]U UJ PQ L W L W W L−= − × −       (A.3) 
*,W L  
whereU is  the bargaining strength of the labour unions. 
 
The first-order conditions for maximization are 
(1 )[( * ) ] [ (.) * ]U W W L U PQ W L− − = −         (A.4) 
and, 
(1 )( *) [ (.) * ]LU PQ W L U PQ W L− − = − −        (A.5) 
 
Using (A.4) and (A.5) one obtains 
LPQ W=            (A.6) 
 
Differentiation of (A.6) leads to 
1( ) 0; ( ) 0L
LL LL
QL L
W PQ P PQ
∂ ∂
= < = − >
∂ ∂
       (A.7) 
 
Simplification from (A.4) yields 
( )
* (1 )PQ LW U U W
L
= + −          (1)  
Equation (1) is the unionized wage function which has been presented in the text.  
 
Differentiating (1) and using (A.7) we find the following results. 
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* 1( ) ( )( (.) ) 0W PQ WL
U L
∂
= − >
∂
 
2
* ( (.))( ) (1 ) 0
LL
W U WL PQU
W L PQ
∂ −
= − + >
∂
;                        (2) 
2
(.)( )*( ) [ ] 0LL L L
LL
UPQ Q L Q UWLQW
P PQ L
+ −∂
= >
∂
if ( ) 0LL LQ L Q+ ≤ i.e 1Lξ ≥ , 
where ( )LLL
L
LQ
Qξ = − is the elasticity of marginal product curve of labour.             
     
Appendix II: Some useful results 
 
Differentiating equations (4) and (5.1) and arranging in a matrix notation one obtains 
1 1
2 2 2
ˆ
         0
          
ˆ
     (1 )ˆ
L K
L W K P L
W
E E Ttr
θ θ
θ θ θ
    
=    
−    
       (A.8) 
where ( /1 ) 0T t t= + > . 
 
Solving (A.8) by Cramer’s rule we obtain the following expressions. 
1
2
ˆ ˆ(1 )( )KP LW E Tt
θθ
θ
= − −  
1 2
ˆ
ˆ (1 )( )L P L
Tt
r Eθ θ
θ
= −  
21ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( )P LEW r Ttθ
θ
−
− = − ;                                     (A.9) 
1 1(1 )ˆ ˆˆ( * ) ( )W K L PE EW r Ttθ θ
θ
+ −
− = − ; and, 
1 2 1 2 0L K K L WEθ θ θ θ θ= − > (as sector 2 is more capital-intensive  
than sector 1 in value sense; and, ( 1P WE E+ = )). 
[Note that ˆ ˆ ˆˆ* P W UW E Tt E W E U= + + . We do not intend to do comparative statics with respect 
toU . So we write ˆ 0U = ] 
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Differentiating equations (6.1) and (7), using (A.9), simplifying and writing in a matrix notation 
one gets 
11 2 1
1 2 22
ˆ ˆ
          
ˆˆ ˆ
          
L L
K K
AtX
K A tX
λ λ
λ λ
   − 
=    
+       
        (A.10) 
where: 1 21 1 2 2 1 1( )[ (1 ) ( (1 ))] 0L LK P L L LK W K L P
TA S E S E Eλ θ λ θ θ
θ
= − + + − >   
1 2
2 1 2 2 1 1( )[ (1 ) ( (1 ))] 0K KL P L K KL W K L P
TA S E S E Eλ θ λ θ θ
θ
= − + + − > ;                       (A.11) 
k
jiS = the degree of substitution between factors j and i in the k th sector, , ,j i L K= ; and, k = 
1,2. For example, 1 1 1( / )( / ),LK L LS r a a r≡ ∂ ∂ )/)(/( 111 WaaWS LLLL ∂∂≡ etc. 0>kjiS for ij ≠ ; and, 
;0<kjjS  and, =∧'' proportional change. 
 
Solving (A.10) by using the Cramer’s rule we get the following expressions. 
1 2 1 2 2 2
1
ˆ ˆˆ( )[( ) ]K L LX A A t Kλ λ λλ= − + −  
2 1 1 2 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ ˆ( )[ ( ) ]L L KX K A A tλ λ λλ= + +                                        (A.12) 
 
Appendix III: Expressions for welfare change         
 
Differentiating (14) one gets 
* *
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 FdD P dD dX P dX tP dM rdK+ = + + −   (A.13) 
Using (15) and (A.13) we write 
*
1 1 2 2 2( / ) FdV V dX P dX tP dM rdK= + + −    (A.14) 
 
From differentiation of (16) one gets 
* *
1 2 2 2 2 2 2[ ]FdY dX P dX X dP tP dM P Mdt rdK= + + + + −    (A.15) 
Differentiation of (17) and use of (A.15) yield 
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* * * *
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( / )[ ]FdM D P dP D Y dX P dX X dP tP dM P Mdt rdK dX= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ + + + + − −  
   (A.16) 
Here note that 11 1 1( , )X F L K=  and 22 2 2( , )X F L K=
 
are the two production functions while the 
full-employment conditions for the two inputs are: 
1 2L L L+ =  and 1 2 D FK K K K K+ = + =  
Therefore, equation (A.15) may be expressed as 
or, 1 1 * 2 * 21 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[ L K L KdY F dL F dK P F dL P F dK P X dt tP dM= + + + + + 2 ]FP Mdt rdK+ −  
     1 1 2 2 2 2 2[ * ]FWdL rdK W dL rdK rdK P D dt tP dM= + + + − + +  
     2 1 2 2 2 2[( * ) ( ) ]FW W dL r dK dK rdK P D dt tP dM= − + + − + +  
or, 2 2 2( * ) ( )dY W W dL P D dt tdM= − + +   (A.17) 
 
Using (A.17), equation (A.16) may be expressed as 
* *
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( / ) ( / )[( * ) ( )]dM D P dP D Y W W dL P D dt tdM dX= ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ − + + −  
or, *2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2[1 ( / )] ( / )( * ) {( / ) ( / )}dM tP D Y D Y W W dL P dt D P D D Y dX− ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ − + ∂ ∂ + ∂ ∂ −  
or, *2 2 2 2[( / )( * ) ]dM v mv P W W dL HP dt dX= − + −   (A.18) 
where: 2 2[(1 ) /{1 (1 )}] 0; (1 )( / )v t t m m P t D Y= + + − > = + ∂ ∂ is the marginal propensity to 
consume commodity 2 (1 0m> > ); and, 2 2 2 2[( / (1 )) ( / )] 0H D P t D D Y= ∂ ∂ + + ∂ ∂ < is the 
Slutsky’s pure substitution term. 
 
Using (A.14) and (A.18) one gets 
1 2 2 2 2( / ) [( * ) ( )]dV V v W W dL tP HP dt dX= − + −    
or, 21 2 2 2 2 2 2
ˆ ˆˆ( / ) [( * ) ( ) ]dV V v W W L L tP Ht tP X X= − + −
     (A.19) 
 
Now 2 2 2LL a X=           (A.20) 
Differentiating (A.20) and using (A.9) and (A.12) one can derive the following expression. 
2
1 11 1 2 1 1
2
( (1 )) ( )
ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]LK W K L PL L KTS E E A AL K tθ θλ λ λλ θ λ
+ − +
= + +
    (A.21) 
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Using (A.19) and (A.21) the following expressions can be written. 
1 2
2 2
1
1( ) ( )[( * ) ]
                       (+)
L
L
v XdV W W a tP
V dK K
λ
λ= − −
          (18) 
2
2
1 1
1
1( ) ( )[( * )( ){ (1 )}
                                           (+)                (+)
LK
W K L P
TL SdV v W W E E
V dt t
θ θ
θ
= − + −
 
                                        
22 2
2 1 2 1 1 2
( * ){ } ( ) ( ) ]
               (+)                            (+)                     (-)    
L
L K
W W a tP X A A tP Hλ λλ
− −
+ + +
    (19) 
 
 
 
